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ABSTRACT: In this paper we will try to show the differences between Quine’s and Gibson’s 
interpretation of the naturalized epistemology project. Namely, although Gibson points out 
that the genetic approach advocated by Quine is the best strategy there is to investigate the 
relations between evidence and theory, and that externalizing of empiricism that it requires is 
one of Quine’s major philosophical contributions, we argue that the assumptions on which 
Gibson’s project is based, apart from the fact that they are in conflict with some strongly held 
intuitions, would have to be essentially different from Quine’s. In other words, contrary to 
Quine’s position within which we have the possibility of staying on more moderate, and in 
our opinion, more plausible behavioristic line of approach, we will try to show that one of the 
consequences of Gibson’s interpretation is that this possibility is ruled out in Gibson’s case. 
On the other hand, this should enable us to draw some more radical conclusions about the 
nature of Quine’s epistemological project. 






American philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine is one of the most significant 
philosophers of the twentieth century. Reasons for valuing Quine’s work lie in the fact that he 
has reformed the empiricist tradition in philosophy practically on his own. However, apart 
from being a reformer of a school of philosophy, Quine is also seen by some theorists as a 
reformer of a discipline whose problems in contemporary philosophy are considered to be 
one of the most important ones, due to their significance and fundamental nature. 
In fact, it could be said that after the successful reform of empiricism, Quine took it 
upon himself to reform epistemology too. However, while there is almost a consensus 
regarding the former endeavor that Quine has changed the face of a great philosophical 
tradition for good, when it comes to the latter, assessments of its value among contemporary 
theorists range from those who completely deny Quine’s contribution (Kim, Stroud, Putnam), 
to those who believe that his insights are a necessary and long-awaited revelation in the field 
of epistemological research (Gibson, Thompson, Wren, Mi). Nevertheless, there is certain 
regularity in these different views about Quine’s reform of epistemology that is important to 
us; in short, theorists who tend to view Quine’s work as a coherent whole see it more 
favorably, unlike those who view it as a “mere collection of doctrines and thesis on a 
multiplicity of apparently disparate philosophical topics” (Gibson 1988, p. 22). 
For example, Roger Gibson believes that the main reason why Quine is not seen as a 
reformer of epistemology is primarily that no effort has been made to realize that naturalism 
that Quine has eventually reached is a more significant position than empiricism he started 
from, and that it is this doctrine that unites Quine’s ideas and makes a systematic whole of his 
work: “[There are] two sources of misinterpretation of Quine’s thought: failure to perceive 
Quine as a systematic philosopher, and failure to appreciate the scope of Quine’s 
commitment to naturalism” (Ibid., xvi). However, although by his own admission he 
followed Quine as regards his proposal for a naturalized epistemology, in this paper we will 
show the differences between Quine’s and Gibson’s interpretation of the naturalized 
epistemology project. 
 Namely, Gibson points out that the genetic approach advocated by Quine in 
epistemological research is “the best way that we have to investigate the relation between 
evidence and theory”, and “externalizing of empiricism that it requires one of Quine’s major 
philosophical contributions” (Ibid., pp. 66-67); but apart from being in conflict with some 
strongly held and, we might say, generally accepted intuitions, we will also try to show that 
the assumptions on which Gibson’s project was based would have to be substantially 
different from Quine’s. However, we believe that even more important is perhaps that the line 
of argumentation that we will follow for this purpose will enable us to draw some more 
radical conclusions regarding the nature and character of Quine’s epistemological project. 
 
 
2. Background of Gibson’s interpretation 
 
 
Despite strong influence it exerted, the common view is that there are certain 
dichotomies in Quine’s philosophy that are thought to jeopardize its unity and make its 
interpretation difficult. These dichotomies can be detected both at the theoretical and the 
methodological level, but the best way to observe them would be to refer to probably the 
most important one – the dichotomy between empiricist and naturalistic views that Quine 
advocated in different periods. 
Namely, when it comes to reality of objects, in his early, empiricist phase Quine 
advocated the instrumentalist position according to which objects are only ‘cultural posits’, 
while theories that imply them are ‘fictions’ (see Quine 1951, pp. 39-43), but in time he has 
become increasingly inclined to the view that they have reality. Since it is commonly 
believed that the main feature of Quine’s later philosophy is that it is primarily naturalistic, 
one of the sure indicators of the weakening of empiricism in favor of naturalism in Quine’s 
work is that objects are less and less conceptualized as posits, and more and more as 
constituents of objective reality. 
However, although at one point Quine was no doubt more inclined to naturalism than to 
empiricism, it should be noted that he never gave up completely some empiricist and 
instrumentalist views. This will be the cause of growing tensions in his philosophy and to 
reconcile them, Quine argued that ontology and epistemology are disciplines that are 
reciprocally contained. In other words, just like answers to questions about method and 
evidence should include answers to questions about truth or what there is, Quine believed that 
those concerning truth should also include answers to questions about method and evidence. 
Although this proposal was at first well received by most Quine’s supporters, it proved 
to be unsatisfactory after all, as evidenced by the fact that some of them began to give priority 
in their interpretation to ontological or questions of truth, over epistemological or questions 
of evidence. They justified it by pointing out that, given the dichotomies in Quine’s 
philosophy, it was the only way to show it for what it ultimately is, i.e. “systematic, 
naturalistic response to the epistemological question of how we acquire our theory of the 
world” (Gibson 1988, p. 22). 
In this regard, Gibson is perhaps the most significant theorist who did not give up on 
presenting Quine as a ‘systematic philosopher’ and his philosophy as a ‘coherent whole’, but 
who also thought that the precondition for such an interpretation is to give priority to 
ontological or questions of truth, over epistemological or questions of evidence. Gibson’s 
grounds for this interpretation were primarily the fact that “ontology (natural science) tells us 
that its only evidence is sensory evidence”. Since sensory evidence is nothing but “activation 
of (physical) nerve endings by physical objects”, thus, in Gibson’s view, ontology should also 
be given priority over epistemology, for whatever the way in which we acquire our theory of 
the world, it certainly “presupposes an ontology of nerve endings” (Ibid., p. 48). 
Among theorists inclined to this type of interpretation (Wren, Thompson), giving 
priority to ontology is thought to have multiple advantages for Quine, because not only it 
“distances [Quine’s philosophy] from the hard-line instrumentalists” (Thompson 2008, p. 
121) to which he was bound by his empiricism, it also makes a systematic whole of it, as we 
shall see below in more detail. However, since it does not seem to matter whether a 
philosophy is systematic as long as it gives substantial answers to the questions it raises – 
which Quine’s philosophy largely does – it seems that systematicity, in itself, is not a 
sufficient reason to adopt the Gibson’s type of interpretation. On the other hand, we have to 
note that this interpretation is incompatible with Quine’s empiricist views according to 
which, generally speaking, physical objects and nerve endings that Gibson refers to are 
nothing but ‘irreducible posits’ that we use in systematization of experiences. 
In a word, the interpretation that Gibson advocates conflicts with Quine’s view of 
ontological relativism, according to which different (ontological) points of view and 
assumptions about what there is (physical objects, nerve endings, etc.) are possible, in which 
we cannot, based on all the available evidence, give priority to any of these assumptions over 
the others.  
Quine was prompted to adopt the doctrine of ontological relativism primarily by the 
fact that theories are underdetermined by empirical evidence, which entails that “if all 
observable events can be accounted for in one comprehensive scientific theory (...) then we 
may expect that they can all be accounted for equally in another, conflicting, system of the 
world” (Quine 1975b, p. 313). On the other hand, the conclusion that we cannot give priority 
to what one system asserts to exist and that it is true over what another system could assert, 
Quine reached primarily through the thesis of indeterminacy of translation. 
Namely, identifying systems of the world or theories with languages in which they are 
expressed, in his empiricist reflections Quine came to the conclusion that their translations 
“can be set up in such ways that, while each consistent with the speech dispositions of 
everyone concerned, they nevertheless can have different sentence-to-sentence correlations 
even to the point where two translations of some sentence can be correlated with sentences 
having opposite truth value” (Gibson 1988, p. 102). The reason for this is primarily that, 
being formed on pragmatic bases, these translations do not imply translation of the 
ontological point of view that is assumed to be contained in these languages/theories, and 
which, for all we know, can be completely different from the one we read into it by the act of 
translation.1 
 
1 To illustrate this thesis, Quine imagines a hypothetical scenario of translating an indigenous language and 
concludes that a linguist can never know with certainty what the statements of his informants actually refer to. 
The famous example used by Quine for this purpose is a fictitious term ‘gavagai’, which is supposed to be 
pronounced in the presence of a rabbit, but a linguist cannot know – based on all the available evidence - 
whether to translate the term as ‘rabbit’, ‘rabbit-stage’, or ‘undetached rabbit-part’. For more detailed 
information on this, see Quine’s papers “Speaking of objects” and “Ontological relativity”. 
Therefore, Quine argues that each conceptual framework or theory of the world must 
have ‘empirically equivalent alternatives’, thanks to underdetermination of theories by 
empirical evidence, but also that there are no grounds for giving priority to any of them for 
the simple reason that – thanks to the fact of indeterminacy of translation, or impossibility “of 
reconciling them by a reconstrual of predicates” – we cannot know what those alternatives 
could be. It follows that just as “there is no answer to the (pseudo-) question of which 
translation is the uniquely correct one”, there is also no answer to the question of which of the 
theories is true, and Quine argues that they are all true “insofar as they measure up to the 
speech dispositions of all concerned” (Ibid., p. 102). 
As it is commonly believed, the most important lesson of these Quine’s conclusions is 
that speaking of objects in a stronger sense is possible only within the same background 
theory or language; but even then, the objects that we speak of are nothing but ‘posits’ whose 
existence is determined not ‘by definition in terms of experience’, but “by theory which is a 
human invention: since we accept the relevant portion of each theory we accept the objects as 
real” (Hylton 2010, p. 21).2 On the other hand, since Gibson presupposes the existence of 
objects or at least some of them in an absolute sense, it seems that he could give priority to 
ontological over epistemological questions only if he largely neglected Quine’s doctrine of 
ontological relativism. This was precisely the case, however, Quine himself is partly 
responsible for it. 
Namely, while the empiricist phase in Quine’s philosophy can be best presented 
through his arguing for the doctrine of ontological relativism,3 in the later period Quine 
increasingly leaned towards the position that presupposes the existence of ‘facts’ or ‘facts of 
the matter’ which would be independent of the question of evidence, in short, to naturalism. 
Although this emphasis on ‘factuality’ has often been unjustifiably interpreted as an emphasis 
on factuality of natural science, it still makes Quine’s later views conflict with earlier ones. In 
order to reconcile the resulting tensions, Quine argued, as noted earlier, that ontology and 
epistemology are reciprocally contained disciplines. However, the thesis of reciprocal 
 
2 In other words, even in this case, when we move within the same background theory/language, Quine argues 
that there is a certain indeterminacy of the objects implied by the theory, which he explained by the fact of 
inscrutability of reference in general. For more information, see Quine’s papers “Speaking of objects” and 
“Ontological relativity”. 
 
3 Specifically, Quine’s empiricist and instrumentalist views would be best represented by three different, but 
closely related theses: indeterminacy of translation, inscrutability of reference, and ontological relativity. 
containment of ontological and epistemological questions imply, for most interpreters, giving 
equal importance to naturalistic and empiricist doctrines in his philosophy. 
In fact, given it focuses on the question ‘What there is?’, or ‘What is truth?’, ontology 
is usually identified with naturalism. On the other hand, since it tries to answer the question 
‘How do we know what there is?’ – a question concerning method and evidence – 
epistemology is identified with empiricism. It follows that, by arguing that ontology and 
epistemology are reciprocally contained, Quine showed at the same time that he eventually 
attached equal importance to the two doctrines (empiricism and naturalism) that he was 
inclined to in different periods. However, while in his empiricist phase Quine emphasized 
that every system of the world must have empirically equivalent alternatives, none of which 
we can give priority to because we cannot reconcile them by reconstrual of predicates, later 
he claimed something that was in principle contrary to this view – that “only one such system 
can be correct” (Gibson 1988, p. 102). 
In other words, in time Quine has increasingly argued for the so-called sectarian 
position contrary to the ecumenical which was a sure sign for theorists inclined to Gibsonian 
type of interpretation that he made a choice “between the two doctrines which he tried so 
diligently to balance – naturalism in which truth is distinguished from and upheld over 
warrant, and empiricism, in which truth becomes indistinguishable from warrant” (Thompson 
2008, p. 114). As ontology is identified with naturalism, and epistemology with empiricism, 
it would mean that Quine eventually gave priority to ontological or questions of truth over 
epistemological or questions of evidence, and this is the second fact on which theorists like 
Gibson based their interpretation. However, before we go into the details of this 
interpretation, it is necessary to say a little bit more about the most important theses of 
Quine’s epistemological program. 
 
 
3. Main features of Quine’s epistemological approach 
 
 
Quine’s proposal for naturalizing epistemology research was a reaction to the negative 
situation, in his view, that largely continues to this day and in which philosophers enjoy a 
privileged position when it comes to answering what is considered to be the most important 
epistemological problem – the problem of validity or justification of our theories about the 
world.  
As is well known, (modern) epistemology is a discipline that was left as a legacy, in the 
form in which it is widely accepted, by the great French philosopher Rene Descartes. It 
primarily deals with questions such as ‘What is knowledge?’, ‘How is knowledge possible?’, 
and ‘What should be done to acquire knowledge?’. To answer these questions, Descartes 
thought that we have to test our beliefs by calling them into doubt.  Thus, using modern 
terminology, he came to the conclusion that beliefs about current sensory states (so-called 
basic beliefs) are the only ones that we cannot have any doubt about, and that all our other 
beliefs should be based on them. 
While not denying the importance of this project in general, Quine thought that when it 
comes to the starting point in evaluating our beliefs, there is really no room for unlimited 
trust in the method of doubt. 
Namely, since the consistent application of Descartes’ method allows to set such 
standards that would make any knowledge claim impossible – even those concerning the 
content of our sensory states – in order to avoid the adverse effects of unlimited skepticism 
about our beliefs that ultimately make them all unjustified, Quine believed that the problem 
should be approached in the spirit of scientific method and not philosophical. However, in 
addition to dissatisfaction with the situation, he believed that there was a rational basis for his 
proposal found in the thesis that the epistemological problem as he saw it, or as an attempt to 
answer the question of how science really developed and how we acquired it is in fact 
scientific, because “(natural) science tells us that our only source of information about the 
external world is through the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces” 
(Quine 1975c, p. 68). 
In a word, Quine’s call for naturalizing epistemology research was based on the belief 
that it is “within science itself, and not some prior philosophy that reality is to be identified 
and described” (Quine 1981, p. 21) and which implies that the only doubts that would be 
legitimate are in fact those regarding problems that are solvable at least in principle, which is 
why they are equal to the doubts we come across in common scientific practice. However, we 
should not think that, because natural science discovered that we obtain information about 
the world through the impact of light rays and molecules on our sensory surfaces it also 
follows that epistemology is not a matter of a priori philosophical discussion, for although 
this fact was known to most epistemologists, it was of little or no importance to them. 
In other words, it turned out that, in order to abandon speculative methodology in 
epistemological research, and establish the natural science one it was necessary to do 
something more than merely emphasize the physical character of processes through which we 
obtain information about the world, and that is a special type of interpretation of the very 
sense data. However, Quine did not hesitate to do so and it is the thesis that sense data can be 
accessed in the same objective spirit that permeates natural sciences that will strengthen his 
belief that he has all the necessary means to relieve philosophy of its responsibility to tell us 
what knowledge is and how we acquire it, and to hand over the problem to disciplines that 
should be, in his opinion, responsible for it. A key step in this direction has been the thesis 
that, contrary to what is assumed by the traditional approach, sensory evidence no longer 
refers to something that is in the subject of perception, but to the presence of some publicly 
available stimuli. 
Namely, although Quine has claimed that there is no room in objective science for 
speaking of sense data (mental states), due to its ambiguity and logical uncertainty,4 he 
believed that sense data (mental states) are open to the same type of study characteristic of 
natural sciences, thanks to the fact that they are characterized by intersubjectivity inherent in 
(natural) science. Quine found the justification for this thesis primarily in the fact that, thanks 
to their ‘behavioral adjuncts’, they can be reconstrued as dispositions towards behavior in 
observable circumstances. In this way, Quine prepared the ground for a view that would be 
applied in epistemological context as well, the view that sensory impressions are equally 
open to objective methods of study, which is why – in the context of epistemological research 
as he sees it – all that subject experiences by receiving impressions from the environment is 
also “open to scientific study” (Quine 1975c, p. 68). 
The research in question concerns the so-called genetic approach and it is a project 
whose implementation, both for Quine’s interpreters and for Quine himself is “the best way 
that we have to investigate the relation between evidence and theory, a task that Quine sees as 
central to traditional epistemology” (Hylton 2010, p. 95). One of the arguments on which this 
claim is based relates to the fact that it is a project that can be implemented by using objective 
 
4 Quine’s view on the pseudo-scientific character of speaking about propositional attitudes such as beliefs was, 
inter alia, based on a distrust of the possibility of translating in general the idiom of a propositional attitude into 
some other, more objective terms: “In each particular case, knowing the circumstances, we may be able to say 
something in other terms that would be no less useful as an aid to transacting some business in hand; but we can 
hope for no verbal equivalent of 'a believes that p' even for given 'a' and 'p', that is independent of the 
circumstances under which it may have been said that a believes that p” (Quine 1969b, p. 146). 
research techniques. However, apart from the thesis that sense data are now ‘out in the open’, 
accessible to intersubjective research techniques, what provides the genetic approach with the 
above objectivity is also the assumed, intersubjective character of the so-called observation 
sentences, which results from the fact that “there is generally no subjectivity in their 
phrasing” (Quine 1969a, p. 87). 
Namely, acquiring a theory of the world takes place, in Quine’s opinion, in parallel 
with language acquisition. However, language acquisition is a relatively complex process 
because it presupposes learning the truth conditions of sentences that can be both nonverbal 
and verbal stimuli. In the first case, truth of the sentences is determined by the world, because 
“although most of the language consists of interverbal associations, somewhere there have to 
be nonverbal reference points, nonverbal circumstances that can be intersubjectively 
appreciated and associated with appropriate utterances” (Gibson 1988, p. 55). In the second, 
it is determined by the relation of observation sentences to theoretical ones that, thanks to this 
relation, also have truth conditions: “Just as ranges of nonverbal stimuli become evidence for 
the truth (i.e. justification) of various observation sentences, these sentences in turn become 
evidence for theoretical sentence” (Ibid., p. 82).5 
However, in addition to representing “the evidence on which our theories rest and the 
point at which language confronts reality directly enough” (Dancy 1989, p. 235), one of the 
distinctive characteristics of observation sentences is that “under agreeing stimulation”, there 
will be “intersubjective agreement” about them. It follows that not only they are sentences we 
learn first–- because “they will usually be about bodies”, but also that observation sentences 
carry a certain objectivity because they are sentences “on which all speakers of the language 
give the same verdict when given the same concurrent stimulation” (Quine 1969a, pp. 86-87). 
Therefore, although through the learning process language will “naturally grow as a 
fabric of sentences” (Mi 2007, p. 124) most of which are related to observation sentences 
only indirectly, since these are sentences on which there is intersubjective agreement – and 
also that observation sentences are the ones that provide evidence for the truth of theoretical 
sentences – Quine argues that it is “possible to give a naturalistic account” of the process of 
language learning and acquiring a theory, “one that does not take for granted ideas such as 
 
5 In other words, Quine interpreted science as a “linguistic structure that is keyed to observation at some points 
(...). Some of the sentences, the observation sentences, are conditioned to observable events (...) while the rest of 
the language depends, for whatever empirical content it has, on its devious and tenuous connections with the 
observation sentences; and those are the same connections, nearly enough, through one has achieved one's fluent 
part in that discourse” (Quine 1975c, pp. 74-75). 
meaning and understanding” (Hylton 2010, p. 27). On the other hand, what allows not to take 
ideas such as meaning and understanding for granted is, as we have seen, the externalization 
of empiricism, that is, the thesis that sense data – or, in traditional terminology, impressions – 
are now also ‘out in the open’, which is why they are also accessible to objective research 
techniques. Thus, the common view is that the genetic approach creates two separate 
questions from the central epistemological question – the relation between evidence and 
theory – which are both open to study using objective research techniques: “‘How are 
observation sentences acquired on the basis of sensory stimulation?’ and ‘How do 
observation sentences serve as evidence for theoretical sentences?’”(Gibson 1988, p. 66). 
 
 
4. Gibson’s ontologism/naturalism 
 
 
Therefore, since the question of how people acquire knowledge about the world is a 
matter that primarily concerns the available evidence – and it is believed that Quine’s 
empiricism is not a theory of truth, but of evidence – the purpose of our reference to the 
genetic approach was, inter alia, to show how it is closely related to Quine’s empirical 
postulates. Moreover, we have seen that introducing it into Quine’s philosophy enabled the 
externalization of empiricism, that is, the thesis that sentences and stimuli are now out in the 
open, accessible to intersubjective (objective) study techniques: “The externalization of 
empiricism amounts to focusing on the relation between observation sentences and stimuli 
and the relation between these same observation sentences and theoretical sentences. The 
genetic approach toward studying these relations amounts to studying language learning”. 
However, what is extremely important and what Gibson draws attention to after all is the fact 
that “behavioral psychology is the medium for this inquiry” (the genetic approach, A/N) 
(Ibid., p. 82). 
In other words, there is a close connection between Quine’s behaviorism and 
naturalism, and the thesis that epistemological research is grounded on the objective, 
scientific basis Quine based on the introduction of behaviorist method into the study of how 
we acquire our theory of the world.6 On the other hand, although Gibson also points out that 
 
6 The significance of the behavioristic doctrine for Quine’s philosophy cannot be overestimated, and we can 
point out in favor of this first that Quine came to the famous principle ‘no entity without identity’ drawing on its 
the genetic approach is the best strategy we have for studying the relation between evidence 
and theory, and that it is “externalizing of empiricism that it requires one of Quine’s major 
philosophical contributions” (Ibid., pp. 66-67), we argue that his interpretation of the 
naturalized epistemology project goes beyond what is guaranteed by behaviorism. In other 
words, we will try to show below that Gibson’s interpretation in its ultimate consequences 
would have to be a fundamentally different interpretation from Quine’s, and that Gibson in 
his approach largely disregards the genetic approach. 
As we noted earlier, the main feature of Gibson’s interpretation of Quine’s philosophy 
involves giving priority to ontological or questions of truth over epistemological or questions 
of evidence. Apart from the fact that at one point Quine started to argue for the so-called 
sectarian position contrary to the ecumenical, Gibson’s grounds for this interpretation 
included the fact that whatever the way in which we acquire our theory of the world, it 
certainly presupposes ontology of nerve endings and physical objects. However, the 
relationship between ontology and epistemology, naturalism and empiricism in Quine’s 
theory is not as simple as it may seem at first glance, as evidenced by the fact that even 
Gibson shows some restraint in his interpretation.  
In other words, like most Quine’s supporters, Gibson has also argued that ontology and 
epistemology are disciplines that are reciprocally contained.7 However, pointing out that 
“epistemological perspective presupposes ontological perspective” – whereas, given that in 
naturalism questions of truth are separate from questions of justification, nothing similar 
 
legacy. Namely, since there is nothing in observable behavior that would testify to the existence of some 
additional, mental states or events, physical objects are for Quine the only ones that can have pretensions to 
reality, because only for them we have clear, behavioral criteria of identity. However, although he does not 
acknowledge their reality – in the sense of reality of physical objects – since their “behavioral adjuncts serve to 
specify them objectively” (Quine 1977, p. 102) Quine recognizes, as we have seen, intersubjectivity of mental 
entities. It is thanks to this fact that mental entities have a role to play in reconstructing the way in which we 
acquire our knowledge of the world, except that they would no longer be seen as ‘entities’, but as “dispositions 
to gross behavior” (Quine 1975a, p. 87). 
 
7 Objections that Gibson addressed to the critics of Quine’s proposal for naturalizing epistemology, above all to 
Stroud, could testify to this. Namely, insisting on an unbridgeable gap between what we receive through our 
senses, and what is or is not true about the outside world as the main drawback of Quine’s position was for 
Gibson a sure sign that Stroud in his criticism “occupied only epistemological perspective”, that is, he “focuses 
only on how epistemology contains ontology, thereby failing to notice that ontology also contains 
epistemology” (Gibson 1988, p. 60). 
could be said for the ontological perspective – he immediately makes it clear that questions of 
truth must be given priority over questions of evidence. On the other hand, even though in his 
epistemological reflections Quine has come up with theses such as indeterminacy of 
translation, inscrutability of reference, and ontological relativity, Gibson argues that this 
interpretation does not jeopardize in any way Quine’s empiricism or his epistemology, 
because Quine's epistemological reflections “occur within an ontological setting”. Since 
“ontological setting [is] that of contemporary science” (Ibid., p. 138), hence the conclusion 
that science as such, and not some first philosophy, would be a place where reality should be 
identified and described. 
In a word, Gibson draws attention to the fact that if we decide to give priority to 
questions of truth – and it seems that we would have to do it if we accept that epistemological 
perspective presupposes ontological perspective – the result will be that epistemology itself 
will become naturalized, which is after all the reason that his interpretation makes a 
systematic whole of Quine’s philosophy. However, while, as we have seen, Quine tried to 
make this transition by “replacing the old empiricist conception of 'experience' with the 
scientific notion of the stimulation of our sensory receptors, and construing 'our theory of the 
world' not as a purely mental entity, but rather as a collection  of sentences to which we offer 
our scientific assent” (Wrenn 2008, p. 2), given the ways in which ontology contains 
epistemology, the idea of naturalizing epistemology research will in Gibson case get a 
fundamentally different and, we should say, much more radical form. 
Namely, although Gibson claims that the externalization of empiricism required by 
Quine's approach is one of his most important philosophical contributions, and naturalistic-
behavioristic thesis “the central axiom of Quine’s entire systematic philosophy” (Gibson 
1988, p. 2), since ontology contains epistemology in ways that “(1) epistemology 
presupposes the existence of the external world; (2) epistemology’s contact points with the 
external world are (physical) nerve endings; and (3) the two cardinal tenets of empiricism 
regarding evidence and meaning are derived from science” (Ibid., p. 59), it is our opinion that 
his naturalism implies a disregard for behaviorist assumptions in favor of naturalistic ones, or 
more precisely, physicalist assumptions in epistemological research. Therefore, we argue that 
we can and must speak of two different and largely incompatible versions of naturalism in 
Quine’s and Gibson’s cases, which we will try to show in what follows. 
 
 
5. Consequences of Gibson’s ontologism/naturalism 
 
 
Therefore, Gibson argues that Quine’s naturalism requires us to accept as indisputable 
facts, or as truths independent of any evidence that epistemology presupposes the existence of 
the external world, and that epistemology’s contact points with the world are physical, i.e. 
nerve endings. On the other hand, since factuality is implied by Quine’s naturalism, primarily 
factuality of modern natural science – and “the very idea of nerve endings, epistemology’s 
contact points to the world, belong to the part of ontology called physiology” (Ibid., p. 48) – 
it seem that we have to conclude that an adequate approach to epistemological questions 
would for Gibson imply purely explanatory models of modern natural science. 
In a word, although Gibson does not state it explicitly, given the ways in which 
ontology contains epistemology – as well as implications of factuality of modern natural 
science – we believe that he argues for an approach whereby “beliefs which the subject is 
thereby caused to form [are] being studied physicalistically, that is by studying 
neurophysiology of the brain-activity which constitutes them” (Dancy 1989, p. 236). 
However, if we keep in mind conclusions of some of the most significant theorists regarding 
the possibility of explaining mental phenomena in a way that such an approach would imply, 
we have to say that it seems unlikely for now, and that it is quite uncertain whether this will 
change in the foreseeable future. 
Namely, despite the fact that mental entities such as beliefs supervene on physical ones 
such as certain (physical) brain states, in his criticism of reductive physicalism Davidson has 
come to the conclusion that “there are no strict psychophysical laws because of the disparate 
commitments of the mental and physical scheme. It is a feature of physical reality that 
physical change can be explained by laws that connect it with other changes and conditions 
physically described. It is a feature of the mental that the attribution of mental phenomena 
must be responsible to the background of reason, beliefs, and intentions of the individual. 
There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its 
proper source of evidence” (Davidson 1992, p. 146).8 On the other hand, theorists such as 
 
8 In a word, although he does not deny that mental events depend on the physical basis that includes nerve 
endings as their part, Davidson concludes that there is a fundamental difference between the mental and the 
physical realm which in principle calls into question the possibility of reducing the former to the latter: 
“Physical theory promises to provide a comprehensive closed system guaranteed to yield a standardized, unique 
Kripke and Levin offer a somewhat different strategy in fighting reductionism in the 
philosophy of mind, arguing that although we can expect identification of a mental state with 
a certain physical brain state, such identification could not be treated as an explanation for 
the simple reason that a physicalist account would leave something out, the phenomenal 
properties of the mental state/event with which it has been identified.9 
In a word, when it comes to the approach we attribute to Gibson, there is a strong and 
widespread tendency to think of mental entities and events as in principle irreducible to their 
physical basis, and therefore inexplicable in physical terms, regardless of further research. 
However, this seems too easy and we have to assume that it is unlikely that Gibson did 
not take into account inherent limitations of this interpretation, as evidenced by the fact, inter 
alia, that he never explicitly argued for this position, but advocated the so-called naturalistic-
behavioristic approach in epistemological research: “The reading of Quine that I am 
advocating focuses on what I have elsewhere dubbed the naturalistic-behavioristic thesis. The 
thesis is naturalistic in that it makes the study of language accessible to empirical 
investigation, and it is behavioristic in that it relies upon behavior as the substance of 
observable data” (Gibson 1988, p. 1-2). With this in mind, it seems that we have to offer 
more convincing arguments that, unlike Quine’s approach, Gibson’s epistemological program 
is actually a reductionist program in the philosophy of mind, which requires us to take a few 
steps back, to the very basics of Gibson’s interpretation. 
As we noted above, one foundation for Gibson’s interpretation and giving priority to 
epistemological over ontological questions has been Quine’s commitment to naturalism that 
 
description of every physical event couched in a vocabulary amenable to law. It is not plausible that mental 
concepts alone can provide such a framework, simply because mental does not (...) constitute a closed system. 
Too much happens to affect the mental that is not itself a systematic part of the mental. But if we combine this 
observation with conclusion that no psychophysical statement is, or can be built into a strict law, we have the 
principle of the Anomalism of the Mental: there are no strict laws at all on a basis of which we can predict and 
explain mental phenomena” (Davidson 1992, p. 147). 
 
9 A famous example used by Kripke and Levin in the criticism of reductive physicalism concerns the feeling of 
pain as a mental state whose identification with the correlated brain state, although possible, would fail to 
explain the (mental) state in which a person is when he feels pain. In other words, these theorists will base the 
thesis that there is a so-called explanatory gap between the physical and the mental which makes explanations of 
the mental by reducing it to the physical inadequate on the fact that these explanations would leave out 
phenomenal properties of mental sensations such as the feeling of pain. See: Levin, Joseph, “Materialism and 
qualia: the explanatory gap”, and Kripke, Saul, “Identity and necessity”. 
was primarily reflected in the adoption of sectarian position, contrary to ecumenical one. 
However, since the adoption of sectarian position was inconsistent with most conclusions that 
Quine had reached in his empiricist phase, he was expected to justify this new, drastic change 
in his attitude, which he did by making a “difference between fact of the matter about physics 
and fact of the matter about translation” (Thompson 2008, p. 121). In a word, Quine tried to 
reconcile tensions between the view that only one system of the world can be the accurate 
system, and the view about indeterminacy of translation by pointing out that “there is no fact 
of the matter to the question of which translation is the correct one, but there is a fact of the 
matter to the question of which physical theory is the correct one” (Gibson 1988, p. 102), i.e. 
that, unlike science, “translation [is] burdened with additional indeterminacy” (Thompson 
2008, p. 122). 
For theorists inclined to Gibsonian type of interpretation (Thompson, Wren), this was 
evidence that, in the context of advocating sectarian and not ecumenical position, a theory 
that would also be a true theory for Quine would have to be natural science or physics, 
because “for physics to be indeterminate, there would have to be some other form of 
knowledge about the world other than science, and it is just this that Quine’s naturalism 
denies” (Gibson 1982, p. 94). However, although Quine pointed out that ‘there is no fact of 
the matter to the question of which translation is the correct one, but there is a fact of the 
matter to the question of which physical theory is the correct one’, given other views he 
advocated, we argue that Quine never drew all the consequences of this point of view. On the 
other hand, Gibson had to do it, which is a thesis that we base primarily on his ontologism 
and the view that there are facts independent of any evidence, which would, in fact, be truths 
that we are informed of by modern natural science. 
Thus, although in both cases there is an insistence on introducing the methodology of 
natural science in epistemological research, in Quine’s case there is a possibility of holding a 
more moderate and, in our opinion, more plausible behavioristic line, while we believe that 
this possibility is ruled out in Gibson’s case. This is primarily based on the view that if we, as 
Gibson suggests, accept as indisputable facts what natural science tells us, then we must also 
have a theory of truth that is independent of evidence, which is why Gibson has no choice but 
to claim that “translation and physics are not on ontological par”, and that “physics, as 
ultimate ontological parameter avoids the indeterminacy (lack of factuality) that plagues 
linguistics” (Thompson 2008, p.123). However, it seems to us that this assertion would be 
empty unless we also assume that the emphasis on natural science or physics has a certain 
advantage; having in mind the ontology of nerve endings, and in general, the ways in which 
ontology contains epistemology according to Gibson, it seems most plausible that this 
advantage would in epistemological context consist in its ability to explain, by its own means, 
the way in which we acquire our beliefs about the outside world. 
In other words, the view that Gibson’s naturalism is in its ultimate consequences a 
variant of reductive physicalism in the philosophy of mind is based primarily on the thesis 
that the assertion that there are no facts about translation, but that there are facts about science 
would have no content unless we also assume the possibility of reducing mental states/events 
such as beliefs to their physical bases such as certain (physical) brain states. On the other 
hand, this is not the case in Quine’s approach, or at least it is not necessarily the case, as 
evidenced by the fact that Gibson would in that case be forced, at least for the sake of a 
working hypothesis, to distinguish between mental and physical objects to which the former 
would be reduced to or explained by. In short, he would have to introduce an ontological 
asymmetry between the mental and the physical that does not exist in Quine’s approach. 
Namely, although Quine often oscillated in attitudes regarding the character of mental 
entities and events, having in mind the genetic approach as his last view and the dominant 
one (at least when it comes to conducting epistemological research) we must conclude that 
mental entities were for Quine equal to physical objects in their ontological status.10 On the 
other hand, if it is true that in explaining the way we acquire our theory of the world Gibson 
argued only for the methodology of modern natural science, viz. reductive physicalism, then 
he would also have to rehabilitate mentalism from which Quine explicitly distances himself, 
and which, moreover, challenges his externalized empiricism. We therefore find it unlikely 
that Quine ever had a theory of truth or factuality that would be independent of empirical 
evidence as attributed to him by theorists inclined to Gibsonian type of interpretation, if for 
no other reason than because that theory would be inconsistent with epistemological research 
as he sees it, in short, with the genetic approach. However, if we follow through this line of 
argument, it will require drawing more radical conclusions about the nature of the 
relationship between Quine’s and Gibson’s naturalism.  
 
10 Although it is undoubtedly unlikely that mental entities could have any role in ‘working a manageable 
structure into the flux of experience’ as physical ones do – which explains the observed differences between 
them – since they are now also out in the open, accessible to inter-subjective research techniques, the same 
behavioral identity criteria that apply to physical objects would also apply to them. In short, we would be 
informed about both of them, as we have seen, by the so-called observation sentences on which there is general 
agreement. 
Namely, taking into account the naturalistic-behavioristic thesis, but at the same time 
the thesis on factuality of modern natural science, although in our view Gibson advocated the 
approach that would concern only the latter, he also believed that there was a link between 
behavioral and physical levels in epistemological research. On the other hand, Quine also 
postulated continuity between behaviorism and (reductive) physicalism, as evidenced by the 
fact that although he thought that, because now we do not have “detailed knowledge of the 
structure of the human brain, and of particular events in particular brains more or less 
speculative answer, or at least a very incomplete answer [is] the best that we can hope for”, 
he still believed that “we may, however, know enough about a brain and its workings to be 
able to make it plausible that the detailed story would be more of the same, an extension of 
our knowledge along the same [behavioristic, A/N] lines” (Hylton 2010, pp. 97-98). 
In other words, given the view that ‘nothing happens in the world without some 
redistribution of micro-physical states’, both Quine and some of his interpreters who, 
generally speaking, did not share Gibson’s beliefs (Hylton) nevertheless believed in 
continuity between behavioral and physical levels in epistemological research.11 However, 
we believe that there can be no question of any continuity, and that Quine did not need an 
assumption about factuality that would be independent of evidence, although some of his 
views might be evidence to the contrary. 
First of all, if we take into account the ways in which ontology contains epistemology, 
and in general, Gibson’s suggestions about factuality of modern natural science which 
strengthen our beliefs that explanatory models of this science would be for him the only 
acceptable ones in the context of epistemological research, the question is in what relevant 
sense it could have anything to do with studying “the ways in which language-learners 
actually move from an understanding of simple observation sentences to an understanding of 
the more complex sentences (...) of which theories are constructed” (Dancy 1989, p. 236). 
In a word, although they both point out that the genetic approach is the best strategy we 
have for answering questions ‘How are observation sentences acquired on the basis of 
sensory stimulation?', and ‘How do observation sentences serve as evidence for theoretical 
 
11 In other words, just as Gibson’s commitment to physicalism was not as clear and unambiguous as is revealed 
here, the same goes for Quine’s commitment to behaviorism. Thus, for example, although Hylton points out the 
difference between behavioral and physical levels in explanations of language, he also points out that in Quine’s 
case these “levels are linked. A behavioural account is an account in terms of dispositions to behaviour. Such 
dispositions are physical states of the organism (…). So a behavioural account is also, by Quine’s lights, a 
physicalistic account” (Hylton 2010, p. 106). 
sentences?’, it is not clear what place the assumptions about nerve endings and in general, 
about truths that we are informed of by modern natural science such as neurophysiology 
could have in it. On the other hand, since the behavioral level would not require any 
assumption about facts that would go beyond the available evidence, it seems that there is no 
reason why Quine should argue – even though he did – that there are no facts about 
translation but that there are facts about science, which would make him committed to 
reductive physicalism as we have seen above. It seems that the only reason Quine could claim 
something like this, and why he might have claimed it is that this assumption would in 
principle neutralize the problem of circularity that his project would otherwise be confronted 
with. However, we have seen that epistemological program based on physicalistic 
(reductionist) assumptions would be inconsistent with other theses of Quine’s philosophy, 
and that – having in mind the attitudes of some of the most important contemporary theorists 
regarding the possibility of reducing the mental to the physical which such an approach 






The naturalized epistemology project can be approached in several different and not 
necessarily compatible ways, but when it comes to projects inspired by Quine’s proposal, it 
seems that the way we approach them will depend primarily on how ambitiously we interpret 
Quine’s thesis on the objective character of sense data, and what conclusions we are prepared 
to draw from it, and thus from the epistemological endeavor. In this regard, it turns out that 
some theorists draw more far-reaching conclusions from this assumption than others, even 
Quine himself. 
In our opinion, this is the case with Roger Gibson who, as we have seen, advocated an 
approach according to which ‘beliefs which the subject is thereby caused to form [are] being 
studied physicalistically, that is by studying neurophysiology of the brain-activity which 
 
12 Although it may seem so, we should not think that giving up physicalism and holding a more moderate, 
behavioristic line that we attribute to Quine would imply his giving up on at least minimal naturalism, especially 
if we keep in mind that in this case the requirement for the introduction of objective research techniques that 
characterize the methodology of natural science would also be met.  
constitutes them’. However, although Quine was in one period inclined to something akin to 
this type of interpretation, we believe that it is at least arguable whether he has ever 
advocated anything as radical as Gibson’s proposal, as evidenced by the fact, inter alia, that 
for him epistemology has never been subordinated to ontology the way it is in Gibson’s work. 
In other words, it seems that Quine rightly sought to preserve equal relations between these 
disciplines, for not only would the adoption of Gibson’s proposal imply radical modifications 
of his empiricism, but it is an open question to what extent, if at all, this proposal is viable. 
Therefore, although they shared some common beliefs such as the necessity of 
naturalizing epistemology research, we argue that there are sufficient grounds for concluding 
that Quine advocated one type of interpretation of the naturalized epistemology project and 
Gibson another type, and that there is no continuity between the assumptions on which these 
projects would be based. In addition, we should not forget that the path Quine followed to get 
to his naturalistic views is significantly different from the one followed by Gibson, which 
will together unable naturalism advocated by Quine in epistemological research, unlike 




















Dancy, J. (1989). An Introduction To Contemporary Epistemology. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Davidson, D. (1992). Mental Events. The philosophy of mind: Classical 
problems/contemporary issues. The MIT press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Gibson, R. (1988). Enlightened Empiricism: An examination of W. V. Quine’s theory of 
knowledge. University press of Florida. 
Gibson, R. (1982). The philosophy of W. V. Quine: An expository essay. Tampa, FL: 
University of South Florida Press. 
Hylton, P. (2010). Quine. New York: Routlege. 
Mi, C. (2007). What is naturalized epistemology? The Quinean project.Naturalized 
epistemology and philosophy of science. Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam – New York. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1969a). Epistemology naturalized. Ontological relativity and other essays. 
New York, Columbia university press 
Quine, W. V. O. (1977). Facts of the matter. American philosophy from Edwards to Quine. 
Norman, University of Oklahoma Press. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1975a). Mind and verbal dispositions. Mind and language, Oxford 
university press. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1975b). On empirically equivalent systems of the world. Erkenntnis, Vol 9, 
No 3, Springer, New York.   
Quine, W. V. O. (1969b). Propositional objects. Ontological relativity and other essays. 
Columbia University Press, New York.  
Quine, W. V. O. (1975c). The nature of natural knowledge. Mind and language. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1951). Two Dogmas Of Empiricism. The philosophical review, Vol 60, 
No1. Duke university press. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1981). Theories and Things. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Thompson, R. J. (2008). Defending Quine’s naturalistic ontology. Naturalism, reference and 
ontology: Essays in honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang publishing, Inc., New York. 
Wrenn, C. B. (2008). Introduction. Naturalism, reference and ontology: Essays in honor of 
Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang publishing, Inc., New York. 
 
 
 
 
